

29 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Headquarters Courier System--An Abbreviated Report

REFERENCES : (a) An Office of Security Survey of the Headquarters Courier System, dated 9 February 1960
(b) Memorandum from Inspector General to undersigned, dated 15 February 1960, Subject: Special Investigation of the Agency Courier System

1. Introduction

a. This report supplements reference (a) to the extent that there is general agreement with the observations, findings, and recommendations contained in that survey.

b. Reference (a) states that the purpose of the survey is to present an up-to-date security evaluation of the Courier System operating out of headquarters facilities. The report took nearly a year to complete and exposes with exhaustive thoroughness weaknesses in practices and procedures affecting the Courier System, and offers solutions for their correction. No attempt was made to delve into the loyalty and character of individual couriers per se.

c. Abbreviated, for convenience, in paragraph 2 below are the more important findings and recommendations contained in Reference (a). Additional recommendations in paragraph 3 are based on my investigation and are directed toward the solutions of specific problems posed in reference (b).

2. Findings and Recommendations

Finding "a": The authority to provide the Agency with mail and courier service rests officially with the Director, Office of Logistics. There are 13 independent courier systems now operating at headquarters ranging in size from a single courier to a group of thirty, in addition to the official Mail and Courier Branch maintained by the Office of Logistics.

Office of Current Intelligence
Office of Research and Reports
Executive Registry, Office of the Director
Warrenton Training Center, Office of Communications
Records Integration Division, DD/P

Office of Training
Office of Personnel
Cable Secretariat
Technical Services Division, DD/P
Office of Security
Office of Central Reference
Photographic Intelligence Center, DD/I
Development Projects Division, DD/P

Recommendation: That the Management Staff conduct a study of the various courier systems at headquarters with a view of reducing duplication. (Note: By memorandum dated 12 March 1960, the DD/S issued instructions to the Chief, Management Staff, to proceed with such a study under the following terms of reference:)

"...to conduct a study of the headquarters Courier Systems for the purpose of eliminating any unnecessary duplication or overlapping of separate systems, recommending at the same time any improvements or economies in services, methods, and controls which may seem to you desirable. The detailed information gathered by the Office of Security is available to your staff."

Finding "b": There is lack of uniformity in the use of Courier and Document Receipts in the handling of official mail and classified materials.

Recommendation: That the Office of Security conduct a survey of the Agency's procedures for classified-document control to insure proper compliance with Executive Order 10501 and pertinent Agency regulations. 05

Finding "c": Failure of individuals to properly address classified mail delays transmission and leads to compromise.

Recommendation: That an Agency Handbook be prepared and published that would consolidate all official directives on the subject, and make it easier for clerical help to follow instructions by setting forth examples and illustrations. 2.20

Finding "d": Couriers fail to properly identify themselves to recipients when collecting classified materials.

Recommendation: That the Chief, OGR Liaison, prepare a memorandum for all Agencies and Departments with whom couriers make contact, requesting their cooperation in asking CIA couriers to identify themselves properly before turning classified materials over to them. All offices in CIA to be similarly notified and requested to ask couriers to show their courier's identification credentials. .

Finding "e": Couriers' failure to request proper identification of the recipient of classified material.

Recommendation: Instruct all couriers to: (1) Deliver classified material to the addressee or authorized-named representative only. (2) Request proper identification from all recipients prior to delivery of classified material. (3) Under no circumstances deliver classified material to unauthorized persons.

Finding "f": Inadequate supervision of couriers' absences.

Recommendation: Provide courier-drivers with a trip manifest or similar card to report times of arrival and departure at all facilities visited. Require supervisors to take daily readings of speedometer mileage as a check against the trip manifest.

Finding "g": Failure of the Agency to equip courier vehicles with adequate facilities for the proper safeguarding of classified materials while in transit creates unnecessary security hazards.

Recommendation: When courier escort is not provided, all vehicles used by couriers will be equipped with a fireproof safe for storage of classified material while in transit. Wherever feasible, a two-way radio telephone should be installed in courier vehicles.

Finding "h": Failure to requalify couriers in the use of firearms.

Recommendation: Individuals so affected to be reported to the Office of Security for arms requalification without delay.

Miscellaneous Recommendations: (1) That representatives from the Office of Logistics, Office of Personnel, and Office of Security meet to consider and adopt better ways and means to prevent the improper transmission of classified material that sometimes occurs when postage slips are lost or become detached from the registered mail or package. (2) When bulk deliveries are made such as RI pouches, the recipient usually signs the Courier Receipt without inventory of the contents. To provide better document control, it is recommended that a manifest-type receipt be prepared for the contents of RI pouches, and the courier insist on inventory and receipt at time of delivery.

3. Additional Observations and Recommendations Based Upon an Independent Investigation

a. The existence of duplicative courier systems within the Agency makes supervision and control of Agency couriers difficult and introduces unnecessary risk to the security of the Agency's operations. Multiple courier systems are conducive to undetected individual security

violations; contribute to nonuniformity in practices and procedures; create staffing problems; are wasteful of manpower and transportation; and make monitoring of courier operations difficult.

b. A total of 109 courier positions appear on the T/O of various Agency components. Paragraph 9b(16), Agency Regulation [REDACTED] Revised 24 February 1959, assigns responsibility for the official Agency Mail and Courier Service to the Director of Logistics. To supervise and perform this function he has been authorized a total strength of 60 staff employees, 44 of whom are cleared couriers and courier supervisors. In addition, special written authority permits OGI and PIC each to maintain four GS-7 couriers with special clearances for special handling and transmission of SI material and critical intelligence information on a twenty-four hour basis. Unauthorized by regulation or special authority, but justified on the basis of necessity by the using component, are 57 additional couriers who operate independently of the official courier system; 31 of these are assigned to DD/P and for the most part perform inter-office messenger service. Distribution of couriers is shown below:

<u>DCI's Office</u>	<u>4 Positions</u>
Courier, GS-7	* 2
Courier, GS-5	* 2
<u>DD/I Area</u>	<u>18 Positions</u>
<u>OGI</u>	
Courier, GS-7	** 4
Courier, GS-4	* 3
<u>PIC</u>	
Courier, GS-7	** 4
<u>ORR</u>	
Courier, GS-5	* 2
Courier, GS-4	* 3
<u>OSI</u>	
Courier, GS-4	* 1
<u>FDD</u>	
Courier, GS-4	* 1
<u>DD/P Area</u>	<u>31 Positions</u>
Courier, GS-5	* 24
Courier, GS-4	* 7

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DD/S Area56 PositionsManagement Staff

Courier, GS-5

* 2

Office of Personnel

Courier, GS-4

* 1

Office of Training

Courier, GS-5

* 1

Office of Security

Courier, GS-5

* 6

Office of Logistics(Mail and Courier Branch)

Courier, Supervisor, GS-7

** 3

Courier, GS-6

** 10

Courier, GS-5

** 20

Courier, GS-4

** 11

Courier, GS-4 (Washington Depot)

* 2

* Unauthorized by Regulations

** Authorized by Regulations

c. The number of individuals used on an "ad hoc" basis to speed the delivery of classified materials by the "hand-carry" method cannot be determined but is known to be extensive. There appears to be no practical way to eliminate or control this procedure. Security of documents in such cases depends upon the integrity of the individual concerned and the responsibility for compromise or loss (if reported) rests with the person or persons concerned. The major defect in the "hand-carry" method is its circumvention of the registry system of document control. As a result, endless hours of search through registers and offices occur when documents are reported lost or misplaced.

d. Paragraph 11.b.(4), Agency Regulation 24 February 1959, states that the Director of Security is to, "develop and conduct internal counterintelligence programs to detect and prevent hostile penetrations of the Agency establishments through its employees." Paragraph b.(5) goes on to state that the Director of Security is to, "establish safeguards necessary to prevent physical penetration of the Agency establishments by unauthorized individuals... ." Nowhere in the regulations is specific mention made of couriers or the Agency Courier System, nor requires the Director of Security to give this activity special attention.

e. At the present time the Office of Security does not maintain an up-to-date complete list of individuals who serve as Agency couriers

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except those assigned to the official Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics. There is no focal point within the Office of Security to constantly deal with and actually supervise all security factors concerned with Agency couriers or courier operations. Such a focal point is needed. Couriers are a well known channel of penetration into any intelligence service. Although this is so, there is no indication that the Agency Courier System has been penetrated nor have the actions of individual couriers established any noticeable evidence of participation in subversive activities.

f. To keep the Agency Courier System a doubly protected and secure instrument requires constant vigilance. Such vigilance does not exist throughout the Agency today, and to guard against damaging incidents which might occur in the future, it is recommended that:

(1) The DD/S instruct the Director of Security to establish a focal point within his office with whom the Office of Logistics and others can coordinate on all matters relating to the individual security of couriers and the Courier System itself.

(2) That the DD/S issue a directive to all units of the Agency employing individual couriers not assigned to the Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics, to provide the Office of Security their names together with a list of offices (outside CIA) visited; the courier schedule and routes; type of transport used, precautions employed to protect classified mail in transit; types of clearances issued to its couriers and to submit all subsequent changes in courier status as they occur.

(3) That the focal point in the Office of Security be designated the office of record for maintaining an up-to-date roster of all Agency couriers and inventory of courier equipment and transportation; that a permanent staffing slot be provided in this office for a full time courier Inspector in grade GS-11 or above to spot check the activities of all Agency couriers and their full compliance with prescribed security practices.

(4) That the Office of Logistics in coordination with the Office of Security review the data furnished in recommendation (2) above to eliminate wherever practicable duplication of courier services, courier routes, and courier vehicles.

(5) That the Office of Logistics and the Office of Security investigate the feasibility and practicability of reducing the number of delivery points in the Pentagon (now numbering more than 30) by the establishment of a special center at the Pentagon to be manned by Agency staff employees provided with proper clearances, whose duties will include internal deliveries and collections to these various offices.

(6) The Director of Security extend his current technical interrogation program to all Agency couriers; that he be instructed to

initiate a positive CI program designed to minimize the danger to National Security and personal embarrassment to the DCI should an individual breach of security occur.

(7) That the Director of Personnel establish a definitive job classification and requirement for Agency couriers and reclassify those engaged in purely internal mail distribution to the position of messenger.

(8) I further recommend that a copy of this report be furnished the DD/S for his information and guidance and that you sign and dispatch the attached memorandum for information to the DCI.



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Attachments

- (1) OCI Courier System
- (2) PIC Courier Activities
- (3) Proposed Memorandum for DCI

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